RUSSELL G. SWENSON

Intelligence Education in the Americas

The notable stir in the United States security community since late 2001 promises a reeducation about the intermingling of foreign and domestic intelligence operations. Many nations in South and Central America are also debating the appropriate role of government intelligence services in their emerging democracies. Across most of the Western Hemisphere, government managers and analysts, as well as interested private citizens, must now educate themselves about both the meaning of intelligence professionalism and how to achieve an appropriate measure of it.

Any intelligence service's product can be considered an educational tool, as "insider information" and, ideally, an impartial interpretation of risks or threats for the elected leaders who may want or need a way into or out of entanglements, or a way to manipulate them.

BASES FOR COMPARISON

In comparing United States and Latin American intelligence services regarding preparation of their professional intelligence personnel and public knowledge about the services, readily available literature documenting national or strategic-level concepts and practices can be referred to, especially for the United States. Literature on South and Central American intelligence services has recently become more explicit and exact, thanks to authors who are closer to primary sources of information, and to a lighter veil surrounding some military intelligence

Dr. Russell G. Swenson teaches courses on research methods and Latin American intelligence issues at the Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. A professional geographer, he is Director of the JMIC's new Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

establishments. But there exist no explicit comparisons of intelligence services in the Americas, whether of professionalization practices or of any other facet of their operations.¹

In 1992, the late Adda Bozeman noted that “comparative studies [of intelligence services] . . . are wanting in depth and significance.” She further cautioned that “much needs to be done by way of understanding the real world before U.S. analysts are ready to formulate internationally tenable theories”² related to intelligence studies. In her final chapter, “Strategic Intelligence in Cold Wars of Ideas,” she narrated a sweeping tale of Spanish pre-Colombian and post-Armada intelligence, unique in Europe, that transcended military concerns, and epitomized the strategic information gathering and intelligence production that underlay effective statecraft on the French front, as well as in the *guerra fria* with Islam.³

Another, more recent, account of Spanish resourcefulness in strategic intelligence gathering and production emerges from Geoffrey Parker’s *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*. Despite his unparalleled sixteenth-century collection arrangements, however, overload and statecraft paralysis arose from Philip’s waiting for ever-more-precise information.⁴

The view that highly centralized control over statecraft information and severely autocratic decisionmaking has been transferred to Latin America permeates Claudio Veliz’s earlier (1980) work on the centralist tradition in the region. The pervasiveness of this deeply embedded, nationalist tradition in Latin America brings Veliz to declare that political elites in this region, even during the latest Cold War, relied on their own political intelligence sources and remained unaffected by U.S. or Soviet intelligence-based attempts to influence who might ascend to political leadership.⁵

South and Central American leaders, whether civilian or military, seem then to have developed their own tightly controlled intelligence services oriented toward political survival. This view is supported by what is known about such celebrated cases as that involving former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori and his intelligence chief Vlademiro Montesinos. The survival of such intelligence arrangements indicates their effectiveness—at least in preserving political autocracy.

Adda Bozeman suggested that the quality of U.S. strategic intelligence has likely been in decline from the days of George Washington’s intimate political–military control over information gathering, to include its use and protection, through to the present time.⁶ Christopher Andrew in 1995 pointed out that, as both General and President, Washington was reluctant to delegate anything having to do with intelligence, a tendency that was reinforced by “the lack of professional staff officers among the citizen soldiers of the Continental Army.”⁷

So far, there is little evidence that a “democratization” of intelligence services, as a function of bureaucratic growth like that observed in the

U.S., especially following World War II, has occurred in parallel fashion in Latin America. Despite a moderate blossoming of literature on Latin American intelligence practices—largely the result of a greater tolerance for media reporting in the region—the question of whether a professional strategic intelligence cadre has emerged that may affect national decisionmaking remains unexplored. Political centralization remains intact in South and Central American countries, to such a degree that, despite regional differences in intelligence professionalization through formal educational arrangements, a sustainable framework for generating impartial strategic intelligence judgments does not yet exist.

The NDU Seminars

The information now available for comparing U.S., South American, and Central American strategic intelligence comes not only from authors outside the government bureaucracies of U.S. and counterpart Latin American intelligence communities, but also from within, or from sources adjacent to, the respective governments. A major factor in bringing government officials and scholars from the hemisphere together is the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS).⁸ Hosted by the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., this Center has brought together each year since 1997 an impressive group of civilians, and some military professionals, from across Latin America for three-week seminar/workshops. The participants, with faculty also from throughout the hemisphere, learn from each other about principles of security and defense program management, and about defense economics, through discussions and workshops on practical applications of those principles across the hemisphere.

In each cohort, a few members of the typical CHDS class of about 60 individuals share an interest in intelligence services, either as academic observers or as intelligence professionals.⁹ A few of the most active individuals have formed an *Observatorio*, an “epistemic community,” whose interests transcend the solely academic, comparative study of intelligence and reach toward influencing legislative outcomes.¹⁰ Members of this organization, along with several other CHDS graduates, in personal interviews and through e-mail correspondence, have explored the questions posed here. CHDS faculty, former students, and other scholars of hemispheric security and defense studies participate in a major annual conference sponsored by the Center. Since 2001, full-text papers prepared for the conference have been published at <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/English/Academic/redesprograms.htm>.

The argument set forth here, namely that the creation of a capable cadre of strategic intelligence professionals varies substantially from one region to

another across the Western Hemisphere, is developed as a “functional”¹¹ approach to intelligence studies. Further, intelligence is equated with “useful knowledge” possessed and applied by individuals indoctrinated into a country’s government bureaucracy; these individuals also must consider themselves intelligence professionals. Sufficient differences exist among the hemisphere’s bureaucratic environments that the concept of “professionalism” defies facile comparative application.¹² Nonetheless, as Glen C. Dealy and the authors of various CHDS papers have pointed out, the concepts of bureaucratic and intelligence professionalism within the dominant cultures of South and Central American countries appear to be converging toward those held by Anglo-Americans, which in turn are tied to the conceptions of bureaucratic behavior expounded by Max Weber.

Intelligence scholarship on Latin America is barely nascent, as reflected in the scant bibliographies for the five countries covered in Brassey’s encyclopedic *Yearbook* on intelligence services.¹³ Several CHDS papers provide the chief available commentary and preliminary applied academic appreciation of national post-(explicitly)-authoritarian intelligence regimes in Latin America. Comparative studies thus far offer only compilations of organizational and legal information related to a series of countries, with minimal application of comparative criteria.¹⁴ This situation suggests the urgency of gathering the insights of intelligence practitioners and observers to substantiate data for the comparative study of intelligence professionalization in the hemisphere. Even with the development of a credible, functionally oriented literature on intelligence processes as viewed through the prism of education, practitioners and academic observers may not see eye to eye.¹⁵ But, in the case of Latin America, the conjunction of practitioners and academicians attuned to intelligence studies, acting through educational programs and institutions, in the public as well as the professional sense, may present an opportunity for a greater integration of scholarship and practice than has been the case in Anglo-America.

PROFESSIONAL INFLUENCES

Just as twentieth-century U.S. strategic intelligence philosophy and practice relied on British tutelage, so lessons from the formidable experiences of Spanish and Portuguese intelligence services may have been absorbed by their American vice-royalties and successor, independent republics.¹⁶ But, as Veliz argues, the centralist tradition in government affairs may itself be the primary inheritance, and that twenty-first-century intelligence services now more closely resemble those of the U.S. in their structure and orientation. The latter interpretation is offered by Susana Christina Lemozy, an academic consultant at the Argentine joint military intelligence school.¹⁷ Lemozy’s comments apply not only to Argentina, but to South

America in general. In terms of intelligence curricula in Latin America, she notes a strong U.S. influence in intellectual method as well as matters of the art, all underlain by a U.S.-heavy bibliography of intelligence literature, starting with Sherman Kent and Washington Platt. Lemozy also points to a considerable British impact on intelligence precepts in early Argentine national history, an influence that lingers through the translated works of Henry Stanley Ferns.¹⁸

At the same time, what is for some a politically more palatable menu of outside influences may be available through the Portuguese and Spanish national intelligence services, both of which maintain extensive Web sites intended to inform their own constituencies about the rationale for government intelligence services in societies that observe democratic values: for Spain, <http://esint60.tsai.es/cesid>; for Portugal, <http://www.sis.pt>. Both sites offer well-considered, detailed answers to questions they expect any democratically inclined populace to ask about a state's national intelligence system.

The greater political palatability of the Spanish or Portuguese models of statecraft practice over the U.S. model is identified, and even recommended, by the long-time and well-known U.S. observer Howard Wiarda, who suggests that U.S. officialdom bears too much political baggage from two centuries of a sometimes overbearing relationship with Latin America for individuals or organizations in the region to experience comfort with too much copying of U.S. patterns.¹⁹ But whether South and Central American intelligence services have borrowed more from the U.S. than the Iberian countries is probably not as important as the well-established idea that these Latin American states operate in a highly centralized fashion, with affairs of state focused tightly around a powerful executive branch, itself headed by a single primary decisionmaker.

This is true even though some countries are well along in the development of constitutionally regulated intelligence services. But because this regulation is nominal, executive power reigns supreme, making the South and Central American states examples of a "unilateral-constitutional" type of control over intelligence services.²⁰

Some members of the *Observatorio* have suggested that their national intelligence services could more naturally emulate the United Kingdom (UK) model. The British Official Secrets Act, for example, may better reflect the degree of secrecy expected of all elements of a Latin American society with respect to affairs of state. But a more open society might consider such "secret affairs" appropriate matters of public debate. In the UK, for example, unrelenting government secrecy is still a serious expectation, even with the advent of some statutory Parliamentary oversight and some relaxation of press restrictions.²¹ In Latin America, despite some openings managed by scholars and government officials who

participate in the *Observatorio*, governmental secrecy, reflective of strong centralized control of intelligence services, remains the rule.

But the relative openness of most components of the U.S. intelligence educational network, spearheaded by the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) and the Central Intelligence Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, and joined by numerous colleges and universities, has set the stage for a continuation of substantial U.S. influence in the development and presentation of formal aspects of the professionalization of Latin American intelligence services personnel, based on the receptiveness of both sides to this aspect of intelligence democratization.²²

THE LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT

The needs and expectations associated with intelligence education should reflect the nature of the South and Central American security and defense environment. Country-by-country differences, compared with factors affecting subregions or the whole Latin American region at once, are important in establishing noticeable patterns in intelligence education choices.

In defense and security terms, the hemisphere's countries have reacted primarily to their continental or land-bridge neighbors, or to internal challenges to the U.S.-condoned status quo, rather than to extra-hemispheric trouble spots. In geopolitical terms, "checkerboard and shatterbelt" patterns accompany alliances made in the course of minor wars, and in the arrangements that have ensured the predominance of peaceful relations among neighboring countries.²³ This has provided ample room for the operation of successful intelligence-supported diplomacy, particularly by Brazil, which in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries experienced amazing success at expanding its borders through the application of *uti possidetis de facto*.²⁴

Internally, most countries have faced serious, extralegal regime challenges in the last three decades. Government reactions have typically become "dirty wars," and because of unavoidable intelligence service involvement, the term "intelligence" is still tainted with such a pejorative connotation that entrée to venues for educating the public about the positive values of government intelligence remains barely passable.²⁵ Twice, during World War II and today, a groundswell of hemispheric solidarity has developed in defense and security terms.²⁶ In a current expression of operational intelligence cooperation and de facto intelligence education growing from the Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT), intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Colombia underwent a serious escalation in late February 2002.²⁷ The outlines of any strategic intelligence cooperation at the national level,

among the political leaders of the hemisphere and their information managers, remain sketchy.²⁸

The subregional collusion among intelligence services in the Dirty Wars of the 1970s and 1980s is the most evident pattern that invites democratically oriented professional education for intelligence personnel in the Southern Cone countries. In the remaining South American countries of the Andean region, including Venezuela, extralegal challenges to political regimes have been common, and are ongoing. In these countries, intelligence education, whether of bureaucratic functionaries or of the population at large, will be principally through demonstration of a professional capacity developed predominantly in military operations. In the Southern Cone countries, in part because of the continued viability of *Mercosur*, the Common Market of the South, a wider international focus brought on by the effects of globalization calls forth broad societal participation in the creation of strategic political intelligence.²⁹ The other major subregion—Central America—characterized by countries with comparatively few people, like the two other regions exhibits enough similarities among its countries to warrant its being placed into a third type of approach to intelligence professionalization through education.

The security and defense environment for strategic intelligence education in South and Central American countries may be represented in no better way than through a summary of press reports (see Table 1). The raw numbers in the table indicate a strength of association between the volume of Southern Cone media reporting and positive developments in the arena of professional intelligence education.

FORMAL INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have well-developed, formal civilian and military intelligence educational institutions.

Argentina

Because of its relative openness, Argentina's two principal strategic intelligence educational institutions, the *Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia* (ENI) (National Intelligence School) and the *Instituto de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas* (IIFA), *Estado Mayor Conjunto* (Armed Forces Joint Intelligence School), are relatively well-known. As an indication of its earnestness, the ENI once published a journal, the *Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia* (1992–1999).³⁰

The ENI's two-year master's degree curriculum in strategic intelligence addresses the expected topics: national defense economics, geopolitics, strategic planning criteria, analytic methods, and Argentine foreign

Table 1. Press Reports on Intelligence, 1997–2001, Compiled by Country

Countries	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1. Argentina	1	2	4	21	15
2. Brazil	2	1	15	12	19
3. Chile	6	2	4	2	7
4. Colombia	5	16	7	16	7
5. Cuba	2	1	1	2	6
6. Ecuador	0	1	0	7	2
7. Guatemala	1	0	0	0	0
8. Mexico	0	0	0	0	1
9. Panama	2	0	3	0	1
10. Paraguay	1	0	0	0	0
11. Peru	14	3	6	0	6
12. Uruguay	0	0	0	0	2
13. Venezuela	2	0	1	3	9
Total articles: 241	36	26	41	63	75

Note: Data compiled by Master Sergeant Andrew Sandifer, USMC, JMIC graduate student.

policy.³¹ Faculty include active-service and retired government officials. Students are government employees from across the spectrum of ministries, almost all civilians, and admission is open to nongovernment personnel (mainly lawyers and business professionals), as well as to foreign students

(mainly from neighboring countries). The school functions within the Office of the Argentine President, and its accreditation is achieved through an association with the *Universidad Nacional de La Plata*. A master's thesis is required, and almost all work is done using open sources. The master's program, in operation since 1999, is now producing its first graduates.

Unlike the well-established ENI, the IIFA is new, but has the firm backing of the military joint staff. Students are mainly military, with an admixture of civilians. Following the ENI's example, the IIFA is seeking accreditation for a master's degree program in strategic intelligence through association with a well-known Argentine university. The IIFA's academic consultant asserts that this school has not yet reached the ENI's academic level, but intends to do so. Both schools represent manifestations of a trend in Argentina, one that is also emerging in other Southern Cone countries, to integrate civilian and military, government and independent, educational resources and perspectives. This occurs at the undergraduate as well as graduate levels. This integration is the result of civilian curiosity about the scientific and technical expertise to be found in the military institutions. Civilians have become accepted by military students, rather than held at arm's length, perhaps because the extremely negative association of Southern Cone military institutions with the Dirty Wars has been eclipsed, at least for the military institution as a whole, even if not for military intelligence organizations.³² IIFA graduates can expect to employ their strategic intelligence perspective in a relatively new (December 2000) Defense Intelligence Directorate, with the mission to provide "strategic military intelligence, not information gathering."³³

Chile

Chilean strategic intelligence education presents a profile very similar to that in Argentina. Here the rise in the late 1990s of a master's degree program in strategic intelligence at the prestigious University of Chile in Santiago, under the auspices of the *Instituto de Ciencias Politicas* (Political Science Institute), reflects movement toward seeing "intelligence" in a positive light. At this school, military instructors and students mix with the predominantly civilian staff and students. The curriculum, too, is similar to the Argentinian ENI, with an emphasis on information for strategic decisionmaking.³⁴ The program is oriented toward both government and private sector intelligence professionalization.

Also similar to, but somewhat more advanced than, the civil-military intelligence education arrangements in Argentina, the University of Chile now offers this graduate degree in strategic intelligence through the country's *Academia de Guerra* (War College).³⁵ Professors from the university teach modules on analysis and intelligence organization. One of these professors, Guillermo Holzmman, has presented his recommendations

for a redesigned national intelligence system to the Chilean legislature.³⁶ The Political Science Institute publishes Working Papers on strategic intelligence management, but does not yet produce a journal devoted to intelligence studies.

Brazil

The Brazilian story of strategic intelligence education cannot be profiled in such sharp relief. Some transparency exists, but the curtains remain in place, allowing only an occasional glimpse of educational strategies or of the institutions engaged in intelligence professionalization.³⁷ Brazil's civilian intelligence service, ABIN, has a professional school (*Escola Nacional de Inteligencia*), and, as in Argentina and Chile, the armed forces, or at least the army, operate an intelligence school (*Escola de Inteligencia Militar do Exercito*) that is apparently open to civilian government intelligence personnel as well.³⁸ Under the 1999 law which created it, the ABIN is responsible for promoting the development of its human resources and of intelligence doctrine through research, as well as for the continuing education of experienced analysts and preparing new officials for analytic functions. An initial course at the National Intelligence School is used as a recruiting tool for the intelligence services. According to Marco Cepik, a professor at the *Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais* (UFMG), his three courses on intelligence studies are probably the only ones offered at the university level in Brazil.³⁹ Cepik and another Brazilian scholar, Priscila Antunes, both founding members of the intelligence *Observatorio*, have noted that the Brazilian legislature, despite legal authorization to do so, has not yet grappled with applying effective oversight over government intelligence activities. Cepik's and Antunes's commentary is a path to encouraging transparency in Brazilian intelligence management, including the management of professionalization through governmental or mixed university/government institutions.

POSITIVE PROSPECTS

The recent emergence of an "intelligence community" concept in the three Southern Cone countries promises, according to *Observatorio* members and other correspondents, to enhance the prospects for intelligence professionalization. The built-in educational function that will come from monthly or more frequent meetings among representatives of each country's intelligence components should stimulate some form of professional competition among individuals, as well as their agencies. The communities at this time exist in a nominal sense. By name, they are: *Centro Nacional de Inteligencia* (CNI—Argentina); *Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligencia* (SISBIN—Brazil); *Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia* (ANI—Chile).

Upheaval among would-be leaders of the Argentinian and Brazilian's communities' approach to intelligence has been covered amply in press reports. A woman, Marisa Del'Isola, took charge of Brazil's ABIN in December 2000, replacing the military director who was dismissed for installing into a leadership position in ABIN an individual accused of torture during the 1964–1985 military regime.⁴⁰ In Argentina, then-President Fernando De la Rúa's initial, reform-minded State Intelligence Secretary resigned in late 2000 after resisting pressure to support the political interests of a former vice-president, and his resignation was accepted.⁴¹

Expectations for the professional capability of intelligence school graduates across the Southern Cone countries are very high. These expectations are reflected in admissions standards, which are deemed by their respective school administrators as likely to increase, so that seminars will be for the exploration of issues among individuals with a similar level of preparation, such as an undergraduate degree in a discipline easily relatable to security or defense studies. The fact that, in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, civilians and military attend the graduate-level strategic intelligence institutions as colleagues suggests that both "sides" will demand the best professional standards of themselves so as to avoid embarrassment to their respective "camps." Finally, the fact that the curricula of these schools have a significant "international studies" or "international relations" component indicates that strategic intelligence professionals are being prepared as advisors, or thinkers at least, on a par with diplomatic officials. Whether members of any country's diplomatic cadre desire or are welcome to attend the intelligence programs is not known. Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals frequently move from government employment to private enterprise or public policy "think tanks," and from one area of government bureaucracy to another, so that cross-fertilization of intelligence graduates with diplomatic officialdom is likely to occur over time.

An interpretation of the need for professionalization of strategic intelligence personnel across the Southern Cone was articulated some fifteen years ago by an Argentine civilian, a financial specialist, Enrique J. J. Cavallini. His words, highly compatible with observations here, resonate clearly across the intervening years, and are worth repeating:

The failure of the Argentine intelligence community consisted in not being able to analyze and interpret signals in a manner that would contradict the military's preconceptions about the outcome of the Malvinas invasion.

[Argentine President Raul] Alfonsín and his successors must ensure that modifications take place to minimize the possibilities of another failure. Especially regarding the intelligence community, these modifications should be made to select better prepared analysts, instead

of those coming from political clientele. Professionals in international relations with area specialization, experience in living abroad, and knowledge of foreign languages are crucial for gathering and analyzing intelligence from abroad. Also, these professional analysts must work more systematically in monitoring and analyzing potential and actual conflict in areas such as Brazil, Chile, and Britain, thereby providing for more rational and effective contingency planning.

Furthermore, decentralization in relation to the flow of information to the decisionmakers is a key element in improving the intelligence services of Argentina, a country where excessive concentration of power in one man has been an unfortunate characteristic throughout its history.⁴²

Cavallini's opinion, and especially his remark about cronyism, does not necessarily apply to other countries of the Southern Cone. But his expectations about the contributions that sound strategic intelligence can make to momentous decisions are shared by those associated with the professional intelligence schools of this subregion.

ANDEAN INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION OBSCURE

In the Andean countries, strategic intelligence education is dominated by military organizations, and exists as an adjunct to operational intelligence. The military remains a widely respected institution across this part of South America, even if, as in Peru, the intelligence leadership has itself been riddled with what is widely considered inappropriate activity. The military is engaged to a greater degree than other government institutions in nation-building, and in providing a presence in insecure rural areas that would otherwise be even more lawless, except for the development of self-defense institutions.⁴³ Any formal intelligence education, whether in civilian or military circles, is conducted in relative obscurity. Observers of civil-military relations in this subregion, including those with a specific interest in the place of government intelligence organizations and their activities in the Andean societies, point out that the military institution is typically placed in charge of the country's overall security, with only nominal civilian oversight.⁴⁴

Across National Lines

One hint of transnational military concern about the development of an appreciation of strategic intelligence issues among the Andean countries lies in the ongoing, annual meeting of intelligence leaders and specialists from ten South American countries, six of them Andean countries (including Chile). This group, dubbed the "South American Congress on Strategic Intelligence," had its first meeting in Bogota, Colombia, with subsequent gatherings in Montevideo, Uruguay and Santiago, Chile. In the

tradition of some of this region's military establishments continuing to see themselves as embodying the state (*la patria*),⁴⁵ the Chilean Army's Director of Intelligence noted that "strategic intelligence has changed its emphasis from purely military needs to other aspects of national coexistence, progress and mutual cooperation, including ecology, science, and economics. Military specialists are today looking for ways to share information of common interest that will allow states to prepare for risks or threats."⁴⁶

Unlike the very active Colombian military intelligence services, where learning by apprenticeship at the operational level appears to be the modal form of intelligence education, Ecuador may offer an object lesson in the democratization of intelligence education. This country features a strong bent in military circles, much as there was in Chile during the Pinochet years, toward public education about what might be termed the non-ecumene, where government institutions are weakly represented if at all. Presently, this education is centered around activities of Ecuador's Military Geographic Institute, which observes its patriotic duties by arousing citizens' interest in unique aspects of the Ecuadorian countryside.⁴⁷ The combination of the military's concern for public education and its strategic intelligence responsibilities may foretell the development of joint civil-military strategic intelligence education, like that already observed in the Southern Cone.

CENTRAL AMERICA: PUBLIC NOTICE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

In terms of intelligence professionalization, Central American countries, though demographically minor players in the larger region, counter that fact with a very active civic society. This situation has developed in the wake of United Nations-sponsored political reconciliation through "Truth Commissions" in El Salvador and Guatemala. Costa Rica, dependent on civilian police rather than on rehabilitated military personnel for internal security, has not faced the trauma of truth commissions. A reflection of the actual and potential social upheaval in this subregion is the presence in this small corner of Latin America of three of the ten UNESCO-sponsored and "socially responsible" social science "think tanks": in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala.⁴⁸

FLACSO (*Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales*), SEDEM (*Asociacion para el Estudio y Promocion de la seguridad en Democracia*), and IEPADES (*Instituto de Ensenanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible*), all active in Guatemala, have made that country the epicenter of intelligence-related conferences, publications, and encounters among representatives of these institutions and the Guatemalan legislature. The most comprehensive

accounts of issues and tensions experienced in the public education project of these institutes are on two Web sites:

<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/justiceproject/guat3rep.htm>

<http://fas.org/irp/world/guatemala/index.html>

In the case of Costa Rica, Paul Chaves, a professor of intelligence and national security, and that country's only specialist in intelligence studies, operates as a one-person wellspring of intelligence education for the public. In one offering, he drew attention to the differences he perceives between the purpose and functions of strategic intelligence personnel and "political" or "secret" police. For example, he noted that intelligence personnel tend to be associated directly with the executive power (the President's office); that the budget for this function is generally not disclosed; that the service is not usually created by law, except only by vague reference; that the service can operate outside, as well as inside, Costa Rica, and that the controlling principles for an intelligence service, in contrast to that of the police, are need, efficacy, and plausible denial.⁴⁹ His pedagogic claim for public consumption, then, appears to be that the state's requirements for an intelligence service, and the degree to which it requires oversight, can be separated from the intrusive information gathering activities of the secret, "political" police. For Costa Rica, more than for the other countries of this sub-region, this claim relies on the existence of a governing structure that reflects entrenched democratic values. At the same time, Chaves's ability to make this claim allows him to argue that an eventual deepening of democratic values in the other countries of the region may allow Central America to sidestep the association of (professional) intelligence services with national-level political repression.

If the intelligence services in Central America ultimately operate solely in the public domain, democratic oversight may well occur, if not by the legislative or judicial branches, then by civil society organizations. But if the current public education trajectory continues in this subregion, and the ability of intelligence services to operate with some secrecy is compromised, then a significant opportunity may exist for the emergence of private companies or individuals to carry out certain secret or paramilitary operations, ever more hidden from any source of democratic oversight.

COMPARING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAS

The expectations for formal strategic intelligence education are high in parts of the Western Hemisphere, especially in some countries of the Southern Cone. These expectations, as reflected in the curriculum of the Argentine and Chilean strategic intelligence schools, suggest that their graduates are

expected to function as very high-level advisors within the executive framework of national governments, or of international enterprises. The Andean countries, with their strategic intelligence aspirations still fixed firmly in the military environment, offer less grandiose possibilities for a flowering of strategic intelligence professionalism, through either civilian enterprise or strategic decisionmaking support to national governments. The Central American effort to bring direct democratic oversight to government intelligence services suggests another, informal but powerful, avenue to strategic intelligence education for an environment that might be especially recognizable to citizens of Sweden or Japan, where the information management and strategic planning aspects of intelligence are thought to be appreciated throughout the society.⁵⁰

Subregional differences in strategic intelligence frameworks, and their attendant educational institutions in South and Central America, become evident from this examination, and happen to reinforce traditional, geographically contiguous patterns of regionalization. Serious attempts are underway in the Southern Cone to suffuse an applied academic appreciation of strategic intelligence professionalism among government intelligence personnel—civilian and military—as well as among selected individuals in the private sector. In Central America, a concerted effort is being focused on public and legislative education to promote effective intelligence oversight from beyond the executive branch of government. In the Andean countries, the armed forces remain strong political actors, and the development of strategic intelligence professionalism depends on their own enlightened efforts.

On the question of whether strategic intelligence professionals in South or Central America are now able to provide impartial service to the leadership of their countries, the picture is not so clear. Occasionally, a chief of strategic intelligence, or the head of an incipient intelligence community in a Latin American country, may enjoy the trust of both intelligence professionals and a nation's democratic leadership, and so may be in a position to render impartial support. But, because of the continuing close linkage of strategic intelligence organizations and personnel to the Office of the President or the military leadership, and the persistent lack of effective oversight of the national intelligence function by other branches of government (notwithstanding some encouraging media coverage in some countries), only rarely are impartial strategic intelligence judgments being offered and used at this time.

Yet, continued development of the academically based intelligence *Observatorio* can at least highlight, and educate respective publics about, the promise of a professionalized intelligence service, or about continuing structural or intellectual weaknesses in support of effective statecraft. Of course, dedicated professionalism must be a preexisting characteristic of

intelligence personnel themselves for the ideals of impartial strategic intelligence to be realized. A 1997 pioneering study of bureaucratic self-accounting in a rural Brazilian state shows that expressions of this phenomenon, recognizable and applaudable by Max Weber himself, may be more widespread than suspected.⁵¹

Although the United States has been inserted into the comparative mix only implicitly here, and Canada and Mexico not at all, the premier U.S. institution oriented toward strategic intelligence education, the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), exhibits some characteristics consonant with strategic intelligence education arrangements of both the Southern Cone and the Andean subregions. An early call for an educational institution that would offer a graduate degree in strategic intelligence came in 1957.⁵² The Defense Intelligence School (later named the JMIC) was created in 1962. But the size and complexity of the U.S. Intelligence Community, only a relatively few students from the Central Intelligence Agency, and competition from the plentiful, well-informed sources of strategic “guidance” in the U.S. help keep the JMIC’s sails trimmed to the point of focusing on operational intelligence and on the intelligence process, rather than on foreign or intermestic policy questions.⁵³ Like the Southern Cone schools, the JMIC accomplishes its educational mission with a roughly equal number of civilian and military faculty and students. As in the Andean countries, however, the education takes place within a strong military intelligence tradition.⁵⁴

For any intelligence service to have the capacity, through education within the government establishment or through independent schooling, to “do” strategic intelligence, intelligence professionals would be expected to be serious strategic thinkers, not mere “functionaries.” Evidence of strategic thinking within any country’s intelligence services would likely include the ability of intelligence personnel to evaluate and carry out an appropriate balance between secrecy and openness, in collection as well as production. More evidence of this kind of thinking would come from their own serious examination of the appropriate interaction between public and private security and intelligence operations, and between law enforcement intelligence and strategic decisionmaking.⁵⁵ Strategically competent intelligence personnel would also be able to assess, and implement, international intelligence sharing arrangements, without each decision being subject to a long bureaucratic chain, ending at the counterintelligence desk.

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

This comparative study of intelligence education across South and Central America has focused on each country in a holistic fashion, setting the stage

for a quasi-experimental research design to be applied to follow-on study over succeeding years.⁵⁶ From an applied academic perspective, a comparative study like this begs the question of whether and how to pursue international intelligence sharing at the strategic level. Gregory Treverton explored some of the existing realities with aplomb in the Winter–Spring 2001 unclassified issue of *Studies in Intelligence*.⁵⁷

Already, intelligence sharing goes on at the operational level, not only between the United States and selected Western Hemisphere countries, as reflected in news reporting, but also in the Southern Cone, where SISME (*Mercosur*'s police intelligence sharing arrangement)⁵⁸ is now in operation. Perhaps more than any other factor, such intelligence sharing depends on a shared set of professional intelligence practices and a shared philosophy.

A worthy goal of reputable government intelligence educational institutions, at the strategic as well as operational intelligence levels, then, is to identify and instill widely acceptable professional ethics.

REFERENCES

- ¹ One recent article does develop a handy framework for comparative examination of the role of intelligence in societies like those of Latin America: Thomas C. Bruneau, "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 323–341. One of his conclusions is particularly germane to the present paper: "Apparently, none of the new democracies has yet focused on changing the profession. But much dealing with intelligence is secret, and outsiders would be unlikely to know about reforms in training. Or better stated, those who know are not likely to divulge the information" (p. 337).
- ² Adda Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992), p.192.
- ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 251–252. To emphasize the relevance of this Spanish history to today, she reminds us that the term "Cold War" originated with Don Juan Manuel, a thirteenth-century Spanish scholar, who applied the term to the prolonged conflict between Christian and Islamic realms carried on by European and North African proxies (p. 255, footnote 1).
- ⁴ Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 56–75.
- ⁵ Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 301, footnote 25.
- ⁶ Adda Bozeman, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
- ⁷ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 9.
- ⁸ For information about this Center, see <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/index.html>.

- ⁹ For example, in a recent seminar, eight individuals identified an interest in intelligence studies, among them: “the provost” of a joint military graduate school of intelligence studies, an army Director of Intelligence, a strategic intelligence analyst of a national directorate for State intelligence, an advisor to a President’s council for security, an advisor to a national defense commission, an analyst with a security and defense council, a university professor, and a director of planning for a strategic policy institute.
- ¹⁰ This *Observatorio* as an epistemic community occupies an “applied academic” niche significantly distinct from the “purely” academic intelligence studies community addressed in Michael G. Fry and Miles Hochstein, “Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1993, pp. 14–28. At the same time, though, members of the *Observatorio* do not intend to engage in actions that may influence multilateral or even bilateral state interests held in common, in the manner addressed by Peter M. Haas, in “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in Haas, ed., *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 1–35. The website of the *Observatorio Latinoamericano sobre Inteligencia y Democracia* is in preparation. It will host a selected bibliography of open sources covering Latin American intelligence and news about intelligence oversight developments.
- ¹¹ Stafford T. Thomas, “Assessing Current Intelligence Studies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1988. For Thomas, the functional approach “explains intelligence activity [in this case, education] by examining its characteristic activities and processes” (p. 237).
- ¹² An agreeable explanation of the chasm separating bureaucratic environments of Anglo- from Latin-American societies is in Glen C. Dealy, *The Latin Americans: Spirit and Ethos* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), esp. pp. 188–193.
- ¹³ Robert D’A. Henderson, *Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook*, 2002 ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002).
- ¹⁴ Two nominally comparative products have appeared: Jose Manuel Ugarte’s *Legislación de Inteligencia: Legitimidad y Eficacia* (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America and Guatemala City: Asociación para el Estudio y Promoción de la Seguridad en Democracia, 2000), and *Inteligencia Policial: Compilación de Textos*, ed. Carmen Rosa de Leon-Escribano Schlotter (Guatemala City: Cuadernos de IEPADES – Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible, 2000).
- ¹⁵ For example, even in the well-developed literature on the U.S. intelligence establishment, Wesley K. Wark, in “Introduction: The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1993, notes that “there remains, at present, a need to educate both the community of practitioners and the community of scholars into the strengths and weaknesses of what each has to offer” (p. 6).

- ¹⁶ Spanish innovations in “diplomacy,” well underway by 1500, are chronicled effectively in Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), esp. chapters 15, “The Spanish Diplomatic Service,” and 26, “The Game at Chess.” A hint at Portuguese intelligence prowess appears in a review of the book *Operacao Lisboa* in the Brazilian newsweekly *Veja*, 20 May 1998, p. 139. The book traces Portuguese intelligence intrigue in securing a favorable decision by the Pope in awarding Portugal a substantial chunk of the east coast of South America through the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). On the “policy of secrecy in the Portuguese discoveries,” see <http://www.uc.pt/bd.apm/bdee0070.htm>.
- ¹⁷ Susana Cristina Lemozy, of the Instituto de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas (IIFA), Estado Mayor Conjunto, in discussion with the author, 11 February 2002, Washington, DC. The author, a faculty member at the U.S. Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), was invited to join a delegation from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to present an overview of the JMIC in Buenos Aires in August 2000 at the request of the Argentine military Joint Staff. Their interest was in exploring ideas that might be applicable to the development of their own graduate-level joint military intelligence school—the IIFA—which began operations in 2001. Basic information about the JMIC is available at <http://www.dia.mil>.
- ¹⁸ Henry Stanley Ferns, *Gran Bretana y Argentina en el siglo XIX*, trans. Ramona del Valle Herrera (Mendoza, Argentina: 1965); also see his *Argentina* (New York: Praeger, 1969) for a discussion of 19th century British activities in Argentina, which are viewed as instructive in strategic intelligence terms.
- ¹⁹ Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 307–308; 356–358. For an academic review of 19th and 20th century U.S.–Latin American neighborly relationships, see Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
- ²⁰ Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 62–67.
- ²¹ Kenneth G. Robertson, in “Recent Reform of Intelligence in the UK: Democratization or Risk Management?” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 144–158; also see Alasdair Palmer, “The History of the D-Notice Committee,” in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 227–249, for a discussion of the decreasing influence of a press censorship measure.
- ²² For example, see *A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies*, Occasional Paper Number Five (Washington, DC: JMIC, 1999), available through the National Technical Information Service, and Meredith Hindley, “Teaching Intelligence Project,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 191–218.

- ²³ See Philip Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1997) for a thorough exposition of this claim.
- ²⁴ The doctrine of “possession by effective occupation.” The principal agent in Brazil’s success was the Baron of Rio Branco (Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, Junior), godfather of Brazilian diplomacy, whose diplomatic cum strategic intelligence skills have not been commented upon in the intelligence literature.
- ²⁵ Anti-insurrection collusion among the intelligence services of the “southern cone” countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay in these dirty wars is traced in J. Patrice McSherry’s “Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System,” *Social Justice*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 144–175. The other side of the story for Argentina, although not a denial or expiatory for security excesses, is told in Ramon Genaro Diaz Bessone, *Guerra Revolucionaria en la Argentina, 1959–1978*, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1996). A balanced chronology and explanation of actions by both sides in Argentina is compiled as *Subversion: La Historia Olvidada*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Asociacion Unidad Argentina, 1998).
- ²⁶ Hemispheric defense cooperation in World War II is treated succinctly in Jose F. Mata, “Defense of the Hemisphere: An Historical Postscript,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 11, Spring 1996, pp. 73–75. In the current “GWAT,” Brazil on 18 September 2001 successfully initiated a move to enlist other American countries to invoke the Rio Pact, the hemispheric mutual defense treaty signed in 1947, in the wake of the 11 September attacks on New York’s World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon.
- ²⁷ Karen DeYoung, “Colombia to Get Aid in Fighting Insurgents: U.S. Will Increase Intelligence Sharing,” *The Washington Post*, 22 February 2002, p. A17.
- ²⁸ University of Chile political scientist Guillermo Holzmann, in “El Rol de la Inteligencia en los Procesos de Cooperativos Regionales,” *Política*, Vol. 39/40, Spring 2000, pp. 73–112, argues that the countries of South America would benefit from sharing their separate strategic intelligence vision of threats and opportunities under the auspices of an international “intelligence community.” His idealistic proposal is tempered by his suggestion that this sharing would be possible only among officials at high bureaucratic levels.
- ²⁹ As pointed out by Jean-Marie Bonthous, in some societies, intelligence becomes a truly knowledge-oriented activity, with participation throughout the society. See “Understanding Intelligence Across Cultures,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 1994, p. 304.
- ³⁰ This journal featured articles by faculty, students, and a variety of Argentine professionals. Many articles were commentaries on the meaning and repercussions of globalization and the information revolution. In August 2000, the Director of the ENI informed the author that the journal would be discontinued in favor of translating into Spanish and republishing various works on intelligence analysis or other aspects of strategic intelligence process. As a justification for this action, he noted that most South American intelligence professionals do not read foreign language publications with ease,

and this translation service, he asserted, would improve professionalization markedly.

- ³¹ Basic curriculum information is at <http://der.jursoc.unlp.edu.ar/intEsNac.html>. The role of the ENI in the formation of intelligence professionals is addressed in some detail in title 7 of the new Argentine National Intelligence Law, which went into effect in late 2001. The text is available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/argentina/ley.htm>.
- ³² Recent Argentine exchanges among these realms are explored in Juan Belikow and Pedro L. de la Fuente, "Los Programas Educativos y Su Rol en las Relaciones Civico-Militares: La Experiencia Argentina," paper presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami, Florida, 16–18 March 2000. Raul Montoya discusses the same phenomenon as it occurs in another Southern Cone country, Paraguay, in "Relaciones Civiles-Militares: Participación de la Universidad Privada de los Países Latinoamericanos en la Defensa Nacional," paper presented at the CHDS REDES (Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies) conference, Washington, DC, 22–25 May 2001. This paper is available at <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/English/Academic/redesprograms.htm>.
- ³³ "Armed Forces to Establish Intelligence Directorate," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translation of article in *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), 4 December 2000.
- ³⁴ See http://www.cien-politica.uchile.cl/Diploma_Inteligencia.htm for a brief description of the curriculum.
- ³⁵ See <http://www.acague.cl/noticias.htm> for a comprehensive description of the one-year program.
- ³⁶ See "Chilean Government to Propose Creation of National Intelligence System," FBIS translation from an article in Santiago's *El Mercurio*, 25 August 2001. Holzmann's detailed recommendations are found in his "Bases, Fundamentos y Propuesta Para un Proyecto Sobre 'Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia,'" Working Paper no. 56, Political Science Institute, University of Chile, August 1996, and "Sistema de Inteligencia en el Estado Chileno: Reflexiones Acerca de su Función," Political Science Institute, University of Chile, 1993. Both are available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/index.html>.
- ³⁷ See the ABIN's website at <http://www.abin.gov.br>.
- ³⁸ A Brazilian newspaper article discusses the Army Intelligence School, founded in 1994. See "Brazil: Secret Army Intelligence Operation Revealed," FBIS translation from *Folha de São Paulo*, 2 August 2001.
- ³⁹ Information on Brazilian strategic intelligence education is from conversations with two Brazilian aficionados of intelligence studies. Information on UFMG professor Marco Cepik's courses appears in Hindley.
- ⁴⁰ "New Intelligence Agency Director Refuses to Testify for Third Time," FBIS translation of article in *Folha de São Paulo*, 19 December 2000.
- ⁴¹ "De Santibanes Addresses Overhaul of Intelligence Services," FBIS translation of article in *Clarín* (Buenos Aires), 24 September 2000; "Former Veep Accuses

- Intelligence Secretary of Scheming Against Him, Demands Resignation,” FBIS translation of article in *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 10 October 2000.
- ⁴² Enrique J. J. Cavallini, “The Malvinas/Falkland Affair: A New Look,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 214.
- ⁴³ For an insightful portrayal of self-initiated rural defense committees that continue to emerge across this subregion, see Orin Starn, *Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).
- ⁴⁴ Adrian Bonilla and Cristina Camacho, “El Sistema de Inteligencia Ecuatoriano y su Contexto Político,” Paper presented at the CHDS REDES conference, Washington, DC, 22–25 May 2001. This paper is available at <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/English/Academic/redesprograms.htm>.
- ⁴⁵ See Brian Loveman, *For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), pp. 213–215.
- ⁴⁶ “Armies Discuss Regional Strategic Intelligence Cooperation,” FBIS translation of Santiago *El Mercurio* article, 26 April 2000.
- ⁴⁷ Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 61–67; also see the Ecuadorian Army Web site at <http://www.fuerzasarmadasecuador.org/espanol/fuerzas/fterrestre.htm>.
- ⁴⁸ FLACSO, the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales*, hosts an eminent collection of scholars, with frequent interchange of researchers among posts or “sedes.” The ten FLACSO posts are identified at <http://www.flacso.org>.
- ⁴⁹ Paul Chaves, “Los Espías no Bastan: Definiendo las Políticas Públicas en Materia de Servicios de Inteligencia en Costa Rica,” paper presented at the CHDS REDES conference, Washington, DC, 22–25 May 2001. This paper is available at <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/English/Academic/redesprograms.htm>
- ⁵⁰ Jean-Marie Bonthous, “Understanding Intelligence Across Cultures,” p. 304.
- ⁵¹ Judith Tendler, *Good Government in the Tropics* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 135–165.
- ⁵² Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 260–261.
- ⁵³ This is not to say that such policy issues are not addressed in JMIC courses. In terms of published research, however, the College only rarely ventures into this realm. One exception was research in 1999 by JMIC student and congressional staff member LtCol Doman O. McArthur, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, published as *Intelligence and Policy: Venturing a Structured Analysis of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Discussion Paper No. 11 (Washington, DC: JMIC, May 2001). His research played a role in creating Public Law 106–113 (The Proliferation Prevention Enhancement Act of 1999).
- ⁵⁴ The authoritative history of the JMIC is traced in Sanders A. Laubenthal, “The Defense Intelligence College and the Professionalization of Military Intelligence,” graduate paper prepared for the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB,

AL, 1987. This paper is available through the Defense Technical Information Service, report no. 87-1515.

- ⁵⁵ One individual who crisscrosses the world on an education mission to link law enforcement intelligence to the realm of strategic decisionmaking is the Australian Don McDowell. His *Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users* (Cooma, NSW, Australia: Istana Enterprises, Pty. Ltd, 1998) is the definitive source for ideas about how to bring “police intelligence” to the level of strategic intelligence.
- ⁵⁶ Glenn P. Hastedt, “Towards the Comparative Study of Intelligence,” *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 69, recommends this approach for comparative cases where the objective is to find whether evolution, or learning, has occurred over time.
- ⁵⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence and the ‘Market State,’” *Studies in Intelligence*, No. 10, Winter–Spring 2001, pp. 69–76.
- ⁵⁸ “Brazil: Mercosur Intelligence Service Created,” FBIS translation of article in *O Estado de São Paulo*, 7 June 2000.